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CASES NOTED
where competing interests are permitted to exist contemporaneously.' 8
The instant case is unique in that the court refused the request for
injunctive relief while noting that, although the competition began after 4
the "severance of their relationship with the appellant . . . there is no
dispute that planning and negotiations were under way before appellees
had severed their connections." (Emphasis added). Other jurisdictions
interpret such actions as being contrary to the fiduciary duties of directors
and employees, and will impose equity restraints on the activities of the
new business' 5 on the basis that the "fiduciaries succeeded in carving a
new business out of the old without paying for it.' 10
Both the good faith of the fiduciaries and the soundness of public
policy in permitting employees the freedom to seek other opportunities8
are the concern of the courts in dealing with this problem. These factors
must be balanced against the interests of free competition to determine
when injunctive relief is merited. The court in the instant case does not
seem to have given the proportionate weight to these factors. By accepting
the defendant's admission that the preliminary organizational work had
been done while in the employ of the plaintiff, the court has seriously
impaired the consideration or value to be given to the entire concept
of good faith in such situations.
COLEMAN ROSENFIELD
TORTS-WRONGFUL DEATH-JONES ACT
The owner of a tug petitioned for exoneration from, or limitation of,
liability when his tug was consumed by fire and a crewman was killed.
The fire was caused by an open flame kerosene lamp which ignited
13. American Inv. Co. v. Lichenstein, 134 F. Supp. 857 (Mo. 1955) (Competitive
business allowed if not a violation of fiduciary relationship); Industrial Indem. Co. v.
Golden State Co., 256 P. 2d 677 (Cal. 1953), where the court held there to be a
difference between a "competing business" and a "similar business," permitting the
latter; Regenstein v. J. Regenstein Co., 213 Ga. 157, 97 SE. 2d 693 (1957); Jasper v.
Appalachian Gas Co., 152 Ky. 68, 153 S.W. 50 (1913) stating majority opinion if
corporation is insolvent and no longer functioning, directors and officers are under no
obligation to refrain from engaging in the same line of business.
14. Defendant corporation was open for business within seven days after defendants
left employ of plaintiff. Brief for Appellee, p. 6, Renpak, Inc. v. Oppenheimer, 104
So. 2d 642 (Fla. 1958).
15. Barden Cream & Milk Co. v. Mooney, 305 Mass. 642, 26 N.E. 2d 324 (1940);
Duane Jones Co. v. Burke, 281 App. Div. 622, 121 N.Y.Supp. 2d 107, modified and aff'd,
117 N.E. 2d 237 (1954).
16. Hart, Termination of the Fiduciary Duty of Business Associated Not to Com-
pete for the Firm's Customers and Suppliers, 4 Duke B.A.J. 16-27 (1954).
17. See cases cited note 10, supra.
18. Hunt v. Rossback, 128 N.J. Eq. 77, 15 A. 2d 227 (1940); Eberle & Co. v.
Morgansteen, 6 La. App. 35 (1927); Texas Shop Towel Inc. v. Haire, 246 S.W. 2d
482 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) stating in the majority opinion that employees are free to
contract for themselves and a contract between an employer and his employees is not
assignable to a third person without the consent of the employee.
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inflammable vapors spread over the surface of a river on which the tug
was navigating. The lamp was carried at a height of three feet instead
of a minimum of eight feet as prescribed by a Coast Guard regulation.
Held, recovery by the administrator was permissible under the Jones Act
even though there was no negligence found on the part of the owner,
and the regulation violated was not promulgated for the protection of
seamen. Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U. S. 426 (1958).
The Jones Act,1 which is exclusive for a wrongful death action in
territorial waters,2 incorporates all United States statutory rights under the
Federal Employee's Liability Act.8 In railroad cases under the FELA, it
has been firmly established that when an injury to an employee was
traceable to a violation of either the Safety Appliance Acts4 or the Boiler
Inspection Act,5 it was not necessary to show negligence on the part of
the employer.6 Further, the liability of the railroad was not limited to
those injuries, the risk of which the statutes were designed to obviate,'
Any violation of these two laws which resulted in an injury negated the
need for any reference to negligence in a subsequent action.8 Negligence,
as understood in the Jones Act,9 is a theory to be applied in a most liberal
manner.10 A seaman's action is not to be narrowed even by limitations
1. Merchant Marine Act (Jones Act), 41 Stat. 1007 (1920); 46 U.S.C. § 688
(92. Lindgren v. United States, 281 U.S. 38 (1930); Gill v. United States, 184 F.2d
49, 57 (2d Cir. 1950) (Hand J. dissenting), where the rule is criticized, but accepted.
3. "[TIhe personal representative of such seaman may maintain an action at law
for damages ... and in such action all statutes of the United States conferring or regu-
lating the right of action for death in the case of railway employees shall be applicable."
46 U.S.C. § 688 (1952),
4. 27 Stat. 531 (1903), 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1952).
5. 36 Stat. 913 (1924), 45 U.S.C. §§ 22-34 (1952).
6. Lilly v. Grand Trunk Western R.R., 317 U.S. (1943); Minneapolis & St. Louis
Pass. R.R. v. Gotschall, 244 U.S. 67 (1917); San Antonio & Aransas Pass. R.R. vs.
Wagner, 241 U.S. 476 (1916); St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern R.R. v. Taylor,
210 U.S. 281 (1908; 159 A.L.R. 870 (1945).
7. Brady v. Terminal R. Ass'n., 303 U.S. 10 (1938); Swinson v. Chicago, St.
Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha R.R., 294 U.S. 529 (1935); Davis v. Wolfe, 263 U.S. 239
(1923); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Layton, 243 U.S. 617 (1917).
8. Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 167 (1949).
9. In Escandon v. Pan American Foreign Corp., 88 F.2d 276, 277 (5th Cir. 1937),
the court allowed much latitude for future definition in deciding an action for injuries
under the Jones Act when it said: "The statute does not undertake to define negligence,
but leaves its significance to be determined by the common law as announced by the
federal courts." In Gonsalves v. Coito, 144 Cal. App. 2d 138, 300 P.2d 742, 744 (1956).
the definition was even less specific when the court said: " 'Negligence' tinder the
Jones Act is the absence of care according to the circumstances."
10. Justice Cardozo prescribed an attitude for decision in stating: "We do not read
the act for the relief of seamen as expressing the will of Congress that only the same
defaults imposing liability upon carriers by rail shall impose liability upon carriers by
water. The conditions at sea differ widely from those on land, and the diversity of con-
ditions breeds diversity of duties. This court has said that "the ancient characterization
of seamen as 'wards of admiralty' is even more accurate now than it was formerly." ...
Out of the relation of dependence and submission there emerges for the stronger party
a corresponding standard or obligation of fostering protection.
The act for the protection of railroad employees does not define negligence. It leaves
that definition to be filled in by the general rules of law applicable to the conditions in
which a casualty occurs." Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, 287 U.S. 367, 377 (1932).
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found in FELA decisions,' and the Jones Act must be considered to
havea welfare purpose.'"
'The Jones Act was intended to add a remedy previously not available
under Maritime Law; that is, for injuries resulting from operating negli-
gence. 13 The Act itself says nothing about negligence, but by giving reference
to the FELA, it incorporates its negligence provision. 14 The courts have
recognized that negligence as interpreted under the Jones Act has been
modified and is viewed in a more liberal light."5 This did not abrogate the
common law doctrine of negligence, and foreseeability is still to be consi-
dered.16 'In general, for negligence to have been imputed to a statutory
violation, it was necessary that the statute was designed to prevent a
particular risk and that any injury resulting was caused proximatly by
"The common law rules respecting proof of employer's negligence should not be
visited too rigorously upon seamen and hence a higher degree of car is required of employers
of seamen than is required of employers of servants for work ashore." Armit v. Loveland,
115 F.2d 308, 311 (5th Cit. 1940).
1I. In Arizona v. Anelich, 398 U.S. 110 (1936), and Beadle v. Spencer, 298 U.S.
124 (1936), companion cases, the Court rejected an attempt to limit a seaman's action
by introducing an assumption of risk doctrine preserved in the FELA.
12. "The Jones Act . . -.As welfare legislation -. . . is entitled to a liberal construction
to accomplish its beneficial purposes." This statement originated in Cosmopolitan Co.
v. McAllister, 337 U.S. 783, 790 (1949). In cox v. Roth, 348 U.S. 207, 210 (1954),
it was quoted and its import served as a major determinant in the decision. "[Sleamen
are wards of admiralty, and as such the courts of admiralty vigilantly guard against any
encroachment upon their rights." Putnam v. Lower, 236 F.2d 561, 569 (9th Cit. 1956).
"Legislation for benefit of seamen is to be construed liberally in their favor." Kinman
v. United States, 139 F. Supp. 925, 928 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
13. Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1923); De Zon v. American Presi-
dent Lines, 129 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1942); GILMORE & BLAcK, TH LAW OF ADMIRALTY
309, § 6-34.
14. 35 Stat. 65 (1908); 36 Stat. 291 (19101; 53 Stat. 1404 (1939); 45 U.S.C.§51 (1952). "Every common carrier . .. shall be liable for . . .injury or death resulting
in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers agents, or employees of
such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence in its cars,
engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats, wharves, or other equipment."
(Emphasis added.) However in Socony Vacuum Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424 (1939) and
De Zon v. American President Lines, 129 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1942), this was interpreted
to mean that assumption of risk and contributory negligence would not be valid defense
against seamen as in railroad workers' cases. See also Arizona v. Anelich, 398 U.S. 110
(1936), and Beadle v. Spencer, 298 U.S. 124 (1936).
See also Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 61 (1949); Sundberg v. Washington
Fish & Oyster Co., 138 F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 1943); Armit v. Loveland, 115 F.2d 308,
311 (5th Cir. 1940).
15. In Armit v. Loveland, at 311, supra note 14, negligence was defined as "any
conduct, except conduct recklessly disregardful of the interest of others, which falls below
the standard established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk
of harm." Cases cited as notes 9 and 10 supra.
16. In Harris v. Whiteman, 243 F.2d 563, 565 (5th Cir. 1957), the following
words are found: "We think it important again to point out that recovery under the Jones
Act is dependent upon proof of negligence having a casual effect on the injury suffered
by a seaman. It is not in the nature of a workmen's compensation act providing com-
pensation without reference to negligence." In Gwinett v. Albatross S.S. Co., 243 F.2d
8, 9 (2d Cit. 1957), the court said: "The foresecability of harm is still a pertinent test
in negligence cases under the Jones Act."
1959]
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the violation.' Both the Safety Appliance Acts 8 and the Boiler Inspection
Act 9 were enacted to facilitate recovery by the employee. 20 The Supreme
Court of the United States interpreted the intent of the legislature in
passing these two acts. This interpretation was that a violation of either
act with a consequential injury therefrom, imposed strict liability.2' Both
of these acts are prefaced by words expressly indicating that the safety of
employees was to be promoted, 22 while the safety of seamen was obviously
intentionally omitted in the Coast Guard regulation violated.23  This is
also true of the parent statutes. 24 In congressional debate concerning the
amendment of these statutes, it was expressly stated that the liability of
the vessel would remain unaffected by this lcgislation.25
In the instant case, the court answered a question never before it in a
Jones Act setting by applying reasoning developed in FELA cases. This
reasoning was that if an employee was injured and the proximate cause
of his injury was the violation of a statute, negligence per se or absolute
liability would be incurred by the employer. 26 The dissent aptly called
attention to the fact that the statutes2 7 germane to FELA decisions were
designed to promote safety for employees. 2 The majority decided this was
immaterial, but did add dignity to the position of the minority by noting
17. The Eugene F. Moran, 212 U.S. 466, 476 (1909); Gorris v. Scott, L.R. 9 Ex.
125, 128 (1874); Boronkay v. Robinson, 247 N.Y. 365 (1928), 160 N.E. 400; RESTATE-
MENT, TORTS § 286, comment c., illustration 5 (1934); PROSSER, TORTS § 34 at 161
l 2d ed. 1955); LowNirzs, Civil Liability Created by Criminal Legislation, 16 MINN. L.
REV. 361, 372-377 (1931); SEAVEY, Principles of Torts, 56 HARv. L. Rtv. 72, 90-92
(1942k.
19. See statute cited note 4 supra.19. See statute cited note 5 supra.
20. "In this view the Safety Appliance Acts, together with the Boiler Inspection Act,
are substantively if not in form amendments to the FELA .... They cannot be regarded
as statutes wholly separate from and independent of the FELA. They are rather supple-
mental to it having the purpose and effect of facilitating employee recovery
Uric v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 167, 189 (1949).
21. "If the Safety Appliance Acts is violated, the question of negligence in the
general sense is immaterial. . . .The two statutes, Safety Appliance Act and FELA, are
in pari materia and where the FELA refers to 'any defect or insufficiency, due to its
negligence in its cars, engines, appliances,' etc., it clearly is legislative intent to treat a
violation of the safety appliance acts as 'negligence' . San Antonio v. Aransas Pass.
Ry. v. Wagner, 241 U.S. 476, 484 (1916).
22. 27 Stat. 531 (1903), 45 U.S.C. § 1 (1952).
23. 33 C.F.R. § 80.16 (h) (1949).
24. 30 Stat. 102 (1951) 33 U.S.C. § 157 (1952) which indicates the purpose of
the Coast Guard regulation was to prevent collision. See also 30 Stat. 102 (1948), 33
U.S.C. § 158 (1952), which provides a penalty for violation of regulations and prescribes
liability to passengers on the part of the pilot, engineer, mate or master. (Emphasis
added.)We . CoNe. REc. 1465 (1897) (remarks of Representative Payne).
26. Brady v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n. 303 U.S. 10 (1938); Patton v. Baltimore & Ohio
R.R., 197 F.2d 732 (3d Cir. 1952); Missouri-K.-T. R.R. of Texas v. Ridgeway, 191 F.2d
363 (8th Cir. 1951); Pennell v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 13 Ill. App. 2d 433, 142 N.E.
2d 497 (1957).
27. See statutes cited notes 4 and 5 suPra.
28. See note 20 supra.
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that the word "safety" was also included in the Coast Guard regulation.'
Liability was imputed for the violation of a statute in a Jones Act case, 0
however, this statute contemplated safety of seamen and foreseeability. The
main contention of the majority in the instant case was "the purpose
of allocating risks between persons who are more nearly on an equal footing
as to financial capacity and ability to avoid the hazards involved." 31 This
reasoning was prognosticated when the Supreme Court of the United States
referred to the Jones Act as welfare legislation.3 2
This decision, like many of the decisions under the Jones Act, lightens
the burden for future plaintiff litigants. Because of the vague statutory
construction, it seems that the court often enters into the field of legisla-
tion. The thin line between statutory interpretation and actual creation of
a new substantive right is indeterminable. If the present trend in govern-
ment towards socialization is accepted, no criticism can be made of the
altruistic purposes such decisions pursue. However, certainty in the law
can never be achieved by obvious stretching of legal terms and theories
to reach a decision.
H. T. MALONEY
CIVIL PROCEDU RE-DISCOVERY-INSU RANCE
Plaintiff, in a negligence action, sought discovery of the policy limits
of defendant's automobile liability insurance. Held, policy limits are not
proper matters of discovery under the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.
Brooks v. Owens, 97 So.2d 693 (Fla. 1957).
Since the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure1 and similar
or identical rules by the several states, the interpretation of the scope of
information obtainable by discovery has been in question. The general rule,
as laid down in the leading federal case of Hickman v. Taylor,2 is that
discovery is not a "matter of unqualified right" but will be granted for
"good cause shown" of all "relevant" matters. The purpose of discovery
29. 30 Stat. 102 (1951), 33 U.S.C. § 157 (1952), "The Commandant is empowered
to establish rules as to the lights to be carried . . . as he . . . may deem necessary for
safety
30.'Fegan v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 198 La. 312, 3 So.2d 632 (1941). Here, a U.S.
Department of Commerce regulation was violated and because of the violation, liability
was imposed. However, the court in interpreting the statute said that adherence to the
statute was mandatory, that safety of the employee was intended, and that foresecability
was present.
31. Keman v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 438 (1958). The Court used
these words in stating that this is the reason magnifications have been made to aid
employees in FELA case. Since the FELA reasoning was being applied the purpose of
the reasoning was also applicable.
32. See cases cited at note 12 supra.
1. 335 U.S. 919 (1948); 329 U.S. 837 (1946); 308 U.S. 645 (1938).
2. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
3. Balazs v. Anderson, 77 F. Supp. 612 (N.D. Ohio 1948).
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